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Summary 
Armed conflict disproportionately affects women, newborns, children, and adolescents. Our 
study presents insights from a collection of ten country case studies aiming to assess the 
provision of sexual, reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health and 
nutrition (abbreviated to women’s and childern’s health, i.e WCH in this paper) interventions 
in conflict-affected settings in Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen. We found that despite large 
variations in contexts and decision-making processes, antenatal care, basic emergency 
obstetric and newborn care (BEmONC), comprehensive emergency obstetric and newborn 
care (CEmONC), immunisation, treatment of common childhood illnesses, infant and young 
child feeding (IYCF) and malnutrition treatment and screening were prioritised in these ten 
conflict settings. Many lifesaving WCH services, including the majority of reproductive, 
newborn and adolescent health services, are not reported as being delivered in the ten conflict 
settings, and interventions to address stillbirths are absent. International donors remain the 
primary drivers of influencing the what, where, and how of implementing WCH 
interventions. Interpretation of WCH outcomes in conflict settings are particularly context-
dependent given the myriad of complex factors that constitute conflict and their interactions. 
Morevoer, the comprehensiveness and quality of data remain limited in conflict settings. The 
dynamic nature of modern conflict and the expanding role of Non-State Armed groups in 
large geographic areas pose new challenges to delivering WCH services. However, the 
humanitarian system is creative and pluralistic and has developed some novel solutions to 
bring lifesaving WCH services closer to populations using new modes of delivery. These 
solutions, when rigorously evaluated, can represent concrete response to current 





Armed conflicts have disastrous effects on civilian populations. It is estimated that more than 
half a million civilians have been killed by combat operations in Syria alone between 
2011and 2019,2 a significant number of whom were civilians (1126230) and amongst them 
women (13173 casualties), children and adolescents (21605 casualties under the age of 18). 
The toll from the extended, indirect effects of conflict due to the destruction of food supplies, 
roads, electricity and water infrastructure, and health facilities has also been catastrophic.3,4 
In 2017, 701 attacks were reported on health facilities, health care staff, patients and 
ambulances in 23 conflict-affected countries.5 Armed conflicts have also negatively affected 
the number of forcibly displaced people in the world, increasing each year in the last decade, 
with 70.8 million people displaced by December 2018.6 New estimates from Bendavid et al. 
in this Series of the number of women and children affected by conflict – at least 630 million 
in 2017, including over 50 million women and children displaced by conflict – is, at over 8% 
of the world’s population, strikingly large.7,8 This paper complements other Series papers by 
presenting empirical insights from a collection of ten country case studies aiming to assess 
the provision of WCH services in contemporary conflicts in Afghanistan, Colombia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria 
and Yemen.
 1 
The key research question asked today is whether traditional humanitarian assistance has had 2 
a positive effect on saving lives and mitigating morbidity and mortality in modern armed 3 
conflicts. The implicit question is whether the humanitarian community has been able to 4 
adapt to the changing nature of armed conflicts and respond to women’s, children’s and 5 
adolescents’ health needs. 6 
 7 
Country case study teams comprised of local and international research partners often 8 
supported by relief agencies. Their work was guided by a common research protocol (Panel 9 
1),1 with desk review parameters, quantitative analysis of national datasets (when available), 10 
Key messages  
1. Many lifesaving women’s and children’s health (WCH) services for key populations 
in conflict settings are not delivered everywhere.  
2. Priorities of donors are the primary drivers of influencing the what, where, and how of 
implementing WCH interventions  
3. Priority predefined packages of WCH services are not commonly agreed on and 
implemented in conflict settings.  
4. Working within the political and governance systems in conflict settings is 
increasingly challenging compared to previous decades, given the dynamic nature of 
modern conflict and the expanding role of Non State Armed groups. 
5. The humanitarian system is creative and has developed new solutions to bring 
lifesaving WCH services closer to populations in very challenging environments. 
6. Recognising and valuing the primary role of local actors would improve timely and 
appropriate WCH care delivery.  
 2 
primary qualitative data collection tools and fieldwork strategies adapted to examine factors 11 
influencing planning and implementation of WCH services in each setting. Detailed results 12 
from each country are published elsewhere.1 The present paper presents the synthesised 13 




Social determinants affecting the health of women, newborns, children and adolescents  18 
The effects of armed conflict are the combination of a number of risks factors including the 19 
nature and exposure to conflict, the social determinants of health and the level of risks and 20 
vulnerabilities experienced by women, newborns, children and adolescents. The social 21 
determinants affecting their health in conflict settings include: lack of safe water and 22 
sanitation; poor quality housing; poor nutrition; and lack of timely access to quality health 23 
services; which in turn influence the health, opportunities for social and intellectual 24 
development and quality of life of children and newborns even more, as they grow up in an 25 
environment in which their ability to exercise their basic rights have deteriorated due to 26 
immediate threats to security during occupation, fighting, etc.; experience of traumatic 27 
events; and lack of opportunity to play as a way of developing social and motor skills. 28 
Additionally, conflict and its attendant trauma often require that women undertake new social 29 
and economic roles. Alternatively, women may become more vulnerable, if they are isolated 30 
and exposed to violence and lack of resources. Women and adolescent girls are more 31 
commonly exposed to sexual and gender-based violence including rape, which is often used 32 
as a weapon of war. 33 
Panel 1. Case study selection criteria and methodology 
  
This Series paper presents insights from a collection of ten country case studies aiming to 
assess the provision of women’s and childern’s health (WCH) services in contemporary 
conflicts in Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Countries were selected to ensure 
representation across geographies and conflict stages (e.g. acute, protracted, post-conflict).  
 
Country case study teams comprised of local and international research partners often 
supported by humanitarian agencies. The teams’ work was guided by a common research 
protocol,1 with desk review parameters, quantitative analysis of national datasets (where 
available), primary qualitative data collection tools and fieldwork strategies adapted to 
examine factors influencing planning and implementation of WCH services in each 
setting..  
 
We used a framework analysis approach to describe the coverage and spectrum of WCH 
interventions delivered, and to assess explanatory variables affecting variation in health 
service delivery. Our analysis focused on decision-making processes, obstacles to 
implementation of proven WCH interventions, and adaptation of service delivery 
strategies to address health needs of women, newborns, children and adolescents in varied 
geographic, political, economic and environmental conditions. 
 3 
 34 
The nature of contemporary armed conflicts: analysing security attributes of the ten 35 
case study countries 36 
Humanitarian actors are confronted today by increasingly complex armed conficts. As 37 
analysed by Wise et al. in this Series,9 each conflict possesses its own unique character and 38 
history, and the impact of each conflict on civilian populations is rooted in complex political, 39 
strategic, and military determinants. Derived and expanded from the conceptual framework 40 
presented in Wise et.al,9 Table 1 presents selected attributes of the case study conflicts 41 
related to the nature of warfare and the strategies and tactics of the engaged state and non-42 
state combatant groups.  43 
 44 
All the country case study conflicts are both intra-state, often labelled “civil” wars, and also 45 
internationalised, inter-state wars or conflict initiated by Non State Armed Groups (NSAGs) 46 
operating internationally. While most of the studied conflict settings are primarily rural in 47 
nature, Syria and Yemen have experienced destructive urban sieges, with the large-scale use 48 
of high explosives, including from airstrikes and artillery, in densely populated areas.10,11 It is 49 
challenging to summarise the organisational structure, strategies and tactics utilised by the 50 
various combatant groups, as the number of these groups are large and vary over time. 51 
However, it is useful to distinguish generally between the strategic attempts of belligerents to 52 
gain political legitimacy among civilian populations or to coerce civilian compliance through 53 
direct attacks or the deprivation of essentials of life or access to humanitarian assistance, and 54 
more specifically to essential WCH services. 55 
 56 
In all ten countries where the conflict is characterised by a multitude of NSAGs, the access to 57 
populations that humanitarian actors have achieved has mostly been a result of humanitarian 58 
negotiations with parties to the conflict. Faced with increasingly complex dynamics in armed 59 
conflict as shown in Table 1 below, humanitarian actors have increased investments in 60 
guidance, skills and capacities to operate in high-risk and access-constrained environments.12  61 
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Combatants: Number of Non State Armed Groups9  
Afghanistan Rural/Urban 37.2 million   9.4 million   227,510 8+ 
Main parties include Afghan Armed Forces, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) Resolute Support, US Forces Afghanistan, Taliban; also have Al Qaeda, 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Haqqani network, militia groups 
Colombia Rural 49.6 million 5.1 million 27,617 8+ 
Main parties include Colombian military, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC), Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN); and Autodefensas 
Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), Rastrojos, Aguilas Negras, Puntilleros, Ejército 




Rural 84.1 million 15.9 million 112,327  100+ 
Main parties are Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo 
(FARDC), Mouvement du 23 mars (M23), Forces démocratiques de libération du 
Rwanda (FDLR), Union pour la Réhabilitation de la Démocratie du Congo 
(URDC), Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en 
République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO), Nduma défense du Congo-
Rénové (NDC-R), Union Paysanne pour le Développement Intégral (UPDI), 
Forces démocratiques alliées/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda 
(ADF/NALU), Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Forces nationales de liberation 
(FNL), Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (ALPCS) 
Kamuina Nsapu, Bana Mura, Mai Mai Mazembe, Force de résistance patriotique 
d’Ituri (FRPI), other Mai Mai militias and ethnic factions, and Burundian 
antigovernment militias. 
Mali Rural 19.1 
Million   
3.6 million 5,886 10+ 
Main parties are Military of Mali, African-led International Support Mission to 
Mali (AFISMA), Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), 
Ganda Iso, Front de libération nationale de l'Azawad (FLNA), Mouvement pour 
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le salut de l'Azawad (MSA), Groupe d'Autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et Alliés 
(GATIA), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), ISIS, Boko Haram 




Main parties include Northeast actors: Nigerian military, Multinational Joint Task 
Force (MNJTF), Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), Boko Haram, ISIS West 
Africa, hunters, dan banga, other militias, AQIM; Middle Belt: Fulani and Hausa 
herders, Tiv and Tarok farmers 
Pakistan Rural/Urban 212.2 million 2.9 million 41,562 14+ 
Main parties are Pakistani military/Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), 
TalibanHaqqani network, al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba,  
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, Jaish-e-
Mohammed, Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Al-Badr, Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP), Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan, other Sunni militant factions 
Somalia Rural 15 million 5.2 million 48,009 7+ 
Main parties are Somali armed forces, Al-Shabaab,  
African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), Kenyan troops, United States 
(US) counterterror operations, ISIS, Al Qaeda 




Main parties are Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), United Nations 
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Mathiang Anyoor, Maban Defence Force, 
outh Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM), Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N),  
Ethiopian Unity Patriots Front (EUPF),  
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), Nuer White 
Army, and many others as it is estimated that South Sudan has at least 40 armed 
groups.15 





Main parties are Syrian Arab Army, Russia, National Defense Force, Shabiha, 
Foreign Shia militias inluding Hezbollah, Free Syrian Army, Jabhat Tahrir 
Souriya, ISIS, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Nusra), US-led coalition, Syrian 
Democratic Forces, People’s Protection Units (YPG), Turkey, Israel 
Yemen Urban 28.5 million 24 million 26,230 11+ 
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Main parties are Saudi-led Coalition, Houthi forces, pro-Hadi security forces, 
Saleh loyalists, ISIS, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Southern 
Movement; supporting groups include Alliance of Yemeni Tribes, Pro-Houthi 




Rural = conflict setting is primarily rural in nature 65 
Urban = conflict setting is primarily urban in nature 66 
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When conflicts undermine primary health care delivery 67 
Our analyses found no clear patterns on WCH intervention delivery in conflict settings. In 68 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, our analysis suggested a statistically significant difference in 69 
coverage of various WCH interventions between severely/moderately and  minimally 70 
conflict-affected provinces/districts based on the battle-related deaths.16,17 In Colombia, 71 
maternal mortality, antenatal care coverage, caesarean section rate, and fertility in 15 to 19 72 
year-old adolescents were significantly different in municipalities with high versus low levels 73 
of conflict (measured as victimisation rates), and no statistically significant difference was 74 
found in vaccination coverage, neonatal, early neonatal and infant mortality rates between 75 
high and low conflict quintiles.18 In Nigeria, although there were differences in various 76 
indicators including vaccination coverage and neonatal and child mortality among the 77 
conflict-affected, marginal and stable (non-conflict) areas, these differences were not 78 
statistically significant. In DRC, insecurity (measured as conflict-related fatality rate) had a 79 
significant effect on maternal death and stillbirth rates, while the impact on coverage of 80 
selected WCH interventions was not significant.19 81 
 82 
In many cases, health services may exist on paper but have ceased to be delivered to people 83 
in the specified catchment area. For example, in Afghanistan, comprehensive emergency 84 
obstetric and newborn care (CEmONC) is largely not delivered in most provinces. Similarly, 85 
the introduction of user fees at public and private health facilities has become standard 86 
practice, as has been seen in Afghanistan (at tertiary level) and southern Sudan. An 87 
overriding concern in Yemen and Syria has been how to evacuate victims of violence from 88 
the site of an incident to the nearest emergency medical centre, an issue that was regularly 89 
raised in the media because of its huge humanitarian, social and political dimension (personal 90 
communication). Health systems in conflict settings can, as in “normal” situations, support a 91 
healthy life, or, by their absence or ineffectiveness, undermine it and perpetuate health 92 
inequity.  93 
 94 
Data from the case study countries show that the presence of armed conflict has attracted the 95 
attention, and even the intervention, of the international community, with evidence of 96 
mitigation of the adverse health impact of conflicts and sometimes even greater health and 97 
healthcare improvements that lead to important improvements in population health beyond 98 
the pre-crisis levels (e.g. DRC, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan).19-21 Thanks to the 99 
humanitarian system, many maternal and child health and nutrition services are now offered 100 
to a majority of those who can be reached in conflict settings.   101 
 102 
Pre-conflict capacity of health systems as a determinant of WCH priorities 103 
There were differences among countries in terms of what services were delivered and how. 104 
These differences can be attributed both to the intensity and nature of the conflict (e.g. 105 
whether active, protracted, cyclical) and the capacity of the health system prior to the 106 
conflict. For example, Syria was a middle-income country prior to the conflict with a 107 
functioning health system providing free-at-the-point-of-delivery primary health care 108 
services. Participants in our study reported that during the war, there were certain gaps in 109 
WCH service availability over time and by geographical locations. In areas where the health 110 
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system was affected the most by the conflict, there was a delay in re-establishing WCH 111 
service delivery. Prior to the conflict, Colombia also had all the infrastructures in place to 112 
deliver WCH services, which were all delivered even during the conflict. Since the conflict in 113 
Colombia spanned about 50 years, the capacity of its health system (e.g. infrastructure and 114 
personnel) was in part developed in the midst of the conflict. All the other case study 115 
countries reported long standing limitations in their health system capacity, at minimum in 116 
the area where the conflict was occurring and experienced a state of protracted conflict, 117 
which limited the reconstruction of capacities of these countries to deliver the wide spectrum 118 
of WCH interventions. 119 
 120 
The period of armed conflict that we studied cannot be disconnected from either the status 121 
antebellum or from what comes (or is to come) after. In situations like Syria, the destruction 122 
caused by armed conflict devastated the ability of whichever authorities are in charge to 123 
maintain the health status of the population at a high level.  However, in some case study 124 
countries (e.g. Nigeria, Somalia), the situation was very different prior to the eruption of 125 
conflict.  In Nigeria, for example, it would be difficult to claim that the exacerbation of 126 
conflict in the Northeast in 2009 had a major impact on routine health service delivery when 127 
the 2008 Demographic Health Survey recorded a vaccination coverage in Borno State of 8%, 128 
which is far below the national average.22 Morever, there are countries where central 129 
Governments have been purposely neglecting the conflict-affected parts of the country, e.g. 130 
the weaknesses in Nigeria may, in fact, contribute to some causes for the origin of the 131 
conflict. Weak health systems in conflict-affected parts of the country are not just “innocent 132 
bystanders,” but rather a symptom of longstanding prejudicial policies. This might not be the 133 
case in Syria, where the national health system was generally strong, but in countries like 134 
Mali, Nigeria and Afghanistan there has been longstanding neglect, which leads to a situation 135 
where, with intervention from the humanitarian community, it is possible that the health 136 
status of the population will counter-intuitively improve during the conflict, only to 137 
deteriorate once again when there is either peace or when the humanitarian community is no 138 
longer providing assistance at the same level. 139 
 140 
Prioritising among WCH interventions: who decides? 141 
Priority setting: an unclear process 142 
As it stands, the prioritisation of WCH interventions is not very clear. Priority in all the case 143 
study settings is given to a set of specific interventions: antenatal care, BEmONC and 144 
CEmONC for pregnant women and immediate care for newborns; childhood immunisation, 145 
treatment of common childhood illnesses, infant and young child feeding (IYCF) and 146 
malnutrition screening and treatment through in-patient, outpatient and stabilisation centres, 147 
as these were considered life-saving interventions. Immunisation is a clear priority in 148 
humanitarian response albeit implementation barriers vary across case study settings, 149 
including limited humanitarian access to populations, lack of infrastructure for cold chain 150 
maintenance and community reluctance. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, we also found a 151 
specific focus on polio campaigns, which has been prioritised due to funding opportunities 152 




On the other hand, there is a set of interventions that is neglected in most countries: abortion 155 
and post-abortion care, as well as provision of contraception were not prioritised by the 156 
implementing stakeholders, particularly in countries where religious and cultural practises 157 
affected the acceptability of such services like in Afghanistan, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, 158 
Somalia and Yemen. Policy and political environments also influenced the provision of these 159 
services, e.g. in Colombia, family planning interventions were mainly restricted to urban 160 
areas, whereas DRC continues to enforce a law that prohibits the sale and use of 161 
contraceptive methods for young people and adolescents. Adolescent health was also another 162 
area that was alarmingly largely ignored, with the majority of the case studies reporting no 163 
evidence of such implementation, with the exception of international humanitarian 164 
organisations-led reproductive health programmes - although with a very limted scope - for 165 
adolescents in DRC and Somalia. 166 
 167 
Ten years ago, the call from Hurst et al. for “accountability for reasonableness” in the 168 
humanitarian sector23 has not been fully heard. What we observed in the ten countries is that 169 
decisions are rather the fruit of a negotiation process between the international organisations 170 
and the national authorities but also between the humanitarian organisations themselves. 171 
Beyond the politics of humanitarian aid, the driver for interventional implementation remains 172 
the access to the right resources: financial resources from international donors and expertise 173 
from national and international organisations. Respondents in most country case study 174 
settings described that the priorities of donors are the primary drivers of influencing the what, 175 
where, and how of implementing interventions. Although the central government in some 176 
countries (e.g. Colombia, Nigeria, and Afghanistan) is more actively involved in managing 177 
and overseeing services, often the involvement in healthcare delivery of government officials 178 
shrinks as conflict escalates in terms of scale and intensity. We found that decisions and the 179 
ability to implement humanitarian WCH interventions are not uniquely based on needs 180 
assessments and security situation, but also on the availability of local and international 181 
actors on the ground who can rapidly deploy, access population groups and monitor the 182 
quality and coverage of WCH interventions. Going forward, a rational prioritization process 183 
in conflict settings could follow the logic of determining the epidemiological burden of the 184 
problem that the intervention seeks to allay; a consideration of the available cost-effective 185 
interventions and actors to address those problems with a high epidemiological burden; and a 186 
consideration of the context, including security risks encountered by communities to get 187 
access to health services and health care workers to deliver health care, cultural factors, the 188 
capacities of the health system, and issues outside of the health sector that might be of higher 189 
priority than health sector issues. For example, this process was followed  in 2019 in 190 
Afghanistan to develop its Integrated Package of Essential Health Services.24  191 
 192 
To bring clarity to the situation, we have identified the existence of four different but not 193 
mutually exclusive models of decision-making amongst governmental and humanitarian 194 
actors, which all dictate the mode of relationship and operation (Table 2). 195 
 196 





Description Examples from case 
study countries  
Centralised  The decision-making system on which interventions are 
prioritised is centralised at government level and often 
influenced by UN agencies and funders. As an 
illustration, participants in Pakistan report stringent 
government regulations to work in conflict areas and 
approvals for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
are particularly cumbersome, in particular to work in 






In some settings, UN agencies and other humanitarian 
actors lead the choice of interventions to be implemented 
and delivery of health services. However, we found in 
our case studies that the decision-making process within 
and across these UN and humanitarian agencies on which 
interventions to prioritise was variable and not following 
uniform guidelines. 
Somalia, South Sudan, 
Yemen, Syria 
Collaborative  Settings where decision-making is a collaborative 
endeavour shared between government and humanitarian 
actors for defining both which WCH interventions are 
delivered, and how. These collaborative relationships are 
not always fully balanced between actors in terms of 
power and technical capacity 
Afghanistan, DRC, 
Nigeria, Mali, Syria 
Gatekeeping This model is characterised by other conflict settings 
where the ministry of health (MoH) and Non-State 
Armed Groups have little or no control or power over the 
technical content of interventions, but become 
gatekeepers to regulate who works in government and 
rebel-controlled areas and delivers which interventions. 
Yemen 
 198 
The four models are not mutually exclusive and vary over time and space. For example, in 199 
the case of Syria, the decision-making model depends on which entity (i.e. government 200 
versus non-governmental authorities) has the authority to deliver health services in a specific 201 
geographic area, which is why two different models co-exist: the humanitarian actors-led 202 
model in non-government-controlled areas; and collaborative model in government-203 
controlled areas. Our findings suggest that there are ongoing tensions between humanitarian 204 
modes of delivery and national health systems.  205 
 206 
Tensions between the humanitarian system and the national health system 207 
The differences in terms of approach between different humanitarian actors or between 208 
national authorities and humanitarian actors illustrate the unpredictability and uncertainty of 209 
situations that require constant adaptability.  210 
 211 
Many case study countries reported needing to frequently adapt their WCH interventions to 212 
the escalation of insecurity in some parts of the country, the constant changes of the conflict 213 
(e.g. nature, scale, movement of troops, nature and intention of belligerants) and the cost of 214 
delivering WCH services in hard-to-reach locations. For example, air delivery is the only 215 
means to resupply health facilities in some parts of South Sudan and Somalia. Humanitarian 216 
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actors reported making adaptations to rapidly respond to and anticipate situations that are 217 
often unpredictable. These adaptations included pre-establishing partnerships between UN 218 
agencies and NGOs with pre-defined roles and responsibilities to respond to population 219 
movements in DRC; using mobile clinics in Afghanistan to access hard-to-reach populations 220 
either due to conflict and/or terrain; and donors making emergency funds available in South 221 
Sudan to pre-stock medical supplies to be able to rapidly respond to outbreaks (e.g. cholera) 222 
or sudden escalation in violence. These modes of operations are based on agile management 223 
mechanisms, which are most often not present in public service and create differences in the 224 
mode of operation between mainstream health services and humanitarian services, that 225 
sometimes create tensions.  226 
 227 
The tensions between the mainstream health system and the humanitarian system are caused 228 
not only by power imbalances and unequal access to resources between international and 229 
national actors, but also by differences in intervention principles. For example, in DRC, there 230 
are tensions between free health care promoted by humanitarian actors clashing with the user 231 
fee policy of the MOH or in Yemen where health authorities expressed frustration at times by 232 
impactful decisions unilaterally made by UN agencies in terms of implementation of key 233 
interventions.  There is no doubt that most national authorities and humanitarian agencies 234 
have a common vision of providing care to the most vulnerable. However, their time horizon, 235 
budget and scale vary between humanitarian agencies targeting special geographical areas 236 
and national authorities managing the national space. They also vary by country, which the 237 
four models of decision-making processes have identified. 238 
 239 
Strategies to deliver WCH services 240 
Humanitarian actors (local and international) and national authorities are confronted by 241 
various obstacles to deliver WCH interventions, as explained earlier. For the purpose of this 242 
study, we developed health25 and humanitarian system building blocks (an adaptation of the 243 
WHO health systems building blocks25), and classified our findings according to the 244 
following domains: leadership, governance and coordination; health financing, health 245 
workforce; essential medicine and supplies; health service delivery; health information 246 
systems and communication; community dynamics and sociocultural factors; and security. 247 
Figure 1 visualises the areas of bottleneck to delivering WCH interventions in the case study 248 
countries, and Table 3 provides solutions documented in our case studies. 249 
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 Figure 1. Areas of bottleneck to implementing sexual, reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health and nutrition 250 
interventions in ten country case study settings 251 
 252 
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Leadership, Governance, and Coordination Major barrier
Community Dynamics and Sociocultural 
Factors
Secondary barrier
Essential Medicines and Supplies
Not considered a 
barrier





Remote management 254 
Cooperation between different humanitarian actors and local authorities (including 255 
government) took on a variety of forms including subcontracting to local organisations (e.g. 256 
Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Mali, Syria). For example, in Syria, multiple cooperation 257 
strategies were used. Humanitarian actors worked with local NGOs while monitoring their 258 
activity through telephone calls and cross-border visits from Syrian healthcare providers to 259 
Gaziantep or Amman. Coordination between a variety of actors also led to improved data 260 
collection in some cases as well as unconventional data collection e.g. e-health, telephones 261 
and informants (e.g. Syria).  262 
 263 
The emergence of pooled funds 264 
Funding levels and conditions varied greatly between contexts. Unresponsive funding 265 
mechanisms, political interference in services (e.g. the Mexico City Policy or “global gag 266 
rule,” which blocks United States federal funding for NGOs that provide abortion counselling 267 
or referrals, advocate to decriminalise abortion or expand abortion services), competition to 268 
get access to funding, and delays in the release of funds contributed to gaps in funding. 269 
Moreover, donors were reluctant to invest in infrastructure or operational costs (e.g. South 270 
Sudan), and multi-year programs to address the root causes of insecurity (e.g. South Sudan, 271 
DRC) and better respond to population needs during protracted crises. Corruption among 272 
governments in some countries also affected how donors distributed funds and to whom, 273 
which in many cases remains mainly concentrated in international organisations. Respondents 274 
described several mechanisms to address funding shortages and being more responsive to 275 
emergencies that included relying upon emergency pooled funds (e.g. Somalia), and other UN 276 
organizations (e.g. Yemen).  277 
 278 
Local health workforce at the forefront 279 
As highlighted earlier, armed conflicts are usually an exacerbating factor of existing 280 
weaknesses of national health systems but also an accelerating factor for health staff 281 
displacement. Shortages of health care workers, in particular the limited availability of health 282 
workers with certain qualifications and specific profiles (e.g. specialisation and gender) was a 283 
key problem in all contexts. Specialists such as gynaecologists, obstetricians, surgeons, 284 
paediatricians, and physiotherapists were often unavailable in most countries. Female 285 
midwives and nurses were lacking in conflict-affected areas of countries like Afghanistan, 286 
Pakistan, and Syria to enable women’s access to health services. Several strategies were used 287 
to address the lack of health workers. These included increasing training programs for health 288 
staff (e.g., Somalia, Yemen, South Sudan), task shifting or task sharing (e.g. DRC, Mali, 289 
Somalia, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen), and expanding the catchment area and 290 
populations for which health workers were responsible (e.g. Pakistan). In Keich district in 291 
Pakistan, for example, senior staff living centrally within the district would rotate trips to 292 
remote areas every month for a week 293 
 294 
Local hiring and partnership with local organisations was a strategy that was employed by 295 
humanitarian agencies to address concerns surrounding health workforce, financing, and 296 
security. Local health workers, given their connection to the communities, were more likely to 297 
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continue to work even when there were funding gaps and salary delays (e.g. Somalia, 298 
Colombia). Local workforce also contributed to mitigate security threats (e.g. DRC, 299 
Colombia), and their importance in communicating and establishing trust with the community 300 
(e.g. Somalia, Colombia). Findings from Colombia, DRC and Somalia demonstrate the 301 
importance of intrinsic motivation and a ‘sense of duty’ for health worker retention: national 302 
health workers, particularly those who worked with children, felt a need to protect the future 303 
of the country. Similarly, in South Sudan, health workers who stayed in insecure communities 304 
did so out of a sense of duty to these communities. 305 
 306 
Numerous forms of health delivery to address barriers included task shifting and taks sharing; 307 
hiring other types of health workers (e.g. community midwives, community health workers; 308 
traditional healers, traditional birth attendants); using new modes of delivery (e.g. remote 309 
management, technology such as WhatsApp or electronic clinical protocols, mobile clinics, 310 
treatment posts, home visits); implementing packages of services (e.g. sexual and 311 
reproductive health and family planning, gender-based violence centres providing delivery 312 
care) or and addressing demand for services. For example in Syria, capacity building 313 
programmes for midwives were implemented to address the population’s preference for home 314 
births, in part due to reported feelings of insecurity inside hospitals which are often targeted in 315 
attacks.   316 
 317 
Rebuilding trust in the community 318 
Culturally-situated beliefs and behaviours influenced acceptance of and access to health 319 
services. The use of humanitarian assistance as a political tool can have resounding damaging 320 
effects on the community’s perception of and trust in lifesaving WCH services. Specific 321 
services such as immunisation and family planning encountered religious and cultural 322 
oppositions in countries such as Pakistan, DRC, South Sudan, Nigeria and Yemen, while 323 
gender rules about female mobility limited access to care (e.g. Pakistan, Afghanistan). 324 
Moreover, the protracted nature of war and the politicisation of aid have fractured the 325 
community’s trust in health service providers (e.g. in Afghanistan, DRC, Pakistan). For 326 
example, the use of polio vaccinators to identify and target Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan has 327 
created long-lasting resistance and reluctance from communities in regard to public health 328 
campaigns in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The recruitment of local staff and use of social 329 
science methods in programmes to better understand community perceptions and expectations 330 
(e.g. the role of women in the household, the decision bearer in a family regarding child 331 
health or number of children a woman has, or the image of humanitarian organisations) and 332 
shape humanitarian interventions has been valued in countries such as Afghanistan or 333 
Pakistan. 334 
 335 
Insecurity: a key driver of WCH service delivery 336 
Facilities’ resource shortages already existing before the crisis were further exacerbated by 337 
attacks, looting and lack of investments during the crisis (e.g. Mali, South Sudan, Yemen). 338 
Vulnerable populations’ access to health care are further exacerbated by breaches of medical 339 
neutrality, i.e. violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 18. Direct insecurity was a 340 
huge disincentive for working in conflict-affected areas due to the elevated risk of targeted 341 
15 
 
threats, attacks on or kidnapping of health workers (e.g. Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, 342 
Colombia). The insecure situation forced health care workers to put in place contingency 343 
plans (e.g. reduced movement and presence of health staff, generating patient evacuation 344 
plans, remote management). In Colombia, health personnel in some zones were trained about 345 
duties and rights of their medical mission and security plans to reduce their personal security 346 
risk. In Syria, remote management from certain hubs (e.g. a cross-border one in Gaziantep), 347 
was used to improve accessibility to certain geographic areas when no physical access was 348 
possible.26 Respondents cited the importance of local partners to provide intelligence about 349 
security threats (e.g. Mali, Colombia). Many international respondents highlighted that they 350 
relied more heavily on local and national staff and partners to deliver services (e.g. DRC, 351 
Somalia, Syria, Yemen).19,20,26,27 In some cases, insecurity necessitated the negotiation with 352 
non-state armed groups to protect their personnel (e.g. Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, 353 
Colombia).18,20,21,28 For respondents in Syria and Afghanistan, such negotiations with 354 
opposition parties allowed access to restricted geographies during a a polio campaign.16,26   355 
 356 
Table 3. Solutions to deliver sexual, reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent 357 







- Political analysis on power balance between the various warring parties and 
the various humanitarian actors 
- Various roles taken by the Health Cluster based on level of engagement and 
capacity of national authorities in the humanitarian response 
- Decentralisation of operations by contracting local organisations 
Health financing - Creation of multi-year funding mechanisms to respond to protracted crises 
- Creation of emergency pooled funds to respond to emergencies such as 
outbreaks or sudden displacement of populations 
Health workforce - Task-shifting and task-sharing 
- Rotation of senior staff to remote areas 
- Hiring local staff to nuture trust with local communities and value the “sense 
of duty” of local staff vis-à-vis their country 
Essential medicine and 
supplies 
- Creation of electronic stock management and supply information system to 
automate the identification of shortage and need for resupply 
Health service delivery - Use of mobile clinics to deliver services to remote areas 
- Recruitment of lay workers who have good knowledge of their community 
- Promotion of community-based services to bring services closer to 
populations 
- Delivery of integrated packages of services at the point of care to avoid 
populations to move several times 
Community dynamics 
and sociocultural factors 
- Social research used as way of informing how to deliver humanitarian 
programmes 
Insecurity - Training of health staff on security measures 
- Remote management 
- Use of security intelligence to assess the situation and authorise staff 
movement 
- Contextually-driven negotiations with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to 





Working within the political and governance systems in modern conflict settings is 361 
increasingly challenging given the dynamic nature of modern conflict and the expanding role 362 
of Non-State Armed groups who are often in control of large geographic areas, which pose 363 
new challenges to delivering services to women, children and adolescents.  364 
 365 
Decision-making processes vary by government, organisation and context. We categorised 366 
them into four different models (centralised; humanitarian actors-led; collaborative; 367 
gatekeeping) that are not mutually exclusive. We also found that pre-conflict health system 368 
capacity, and thus readiness to respond in unpredictable events, varied greatly by case study 369 
setting. Important enabling factors included the income status of countries (e.g. middle-370 
income versus low-income), existing infrastructure and resilience of the health system.  371 
 372 
Despite large variations in sociocultural and geographical contexts and decision-making 373 
processes, there was consistency among prioritisation of key WCH interventions (i.e. 374 
antenatal care, BEmONC, CEmONC, immunisation, treatment of common childhood 375 
illnesses, IYCF and malnutrition treatment and screening) as well as the neglect of other such 376 
interventions (sexual, reproductive, newborn and adolescent health, and those for stillbirths). 377 
Given the dynamic nature of modern conflicts, proactively defining and agreeing upon an 378 
evidence-based comprehensive WCH package of interventions, taking into account existing 379 
evidence and guidelines (e.g. Inter-Agency Field Manual on Reproductive Health in Crises29,  380 
Newborn Health in Humanitarian Settings Field Guide30) could be an effective strategy to 381 
respond to sudden situations. The prioritisation process, in a context of scarce resources, 382 
could be an effective approach to identify the key interventions to implement and decide on 383 
the allocation of resources.  384 
 385 
The humanitarian system is creative and has developed new solutions to bring lifesaving 386 
WCH services closer to populations by hiring and training other types of health workers, 387 
often from the affected community and using new modes of delivery. These solutions, when 388 
rigorously evaluated, can represent a concrete, timely response to current implementation 389 
challenges and remind health authorities of their responsibility to deliver basic health services 390 
to the whole population. 391 
 392 
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